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Chapter 7
The UK Approach to Insuring Defined Benefit
Pension Plans
David McCarthy and Anthony Neuberger

The UK government recently established a Pension Protection Fund (PPF)
to protect members of private sector defined benefit (DB) occupational
pension schemes1 whose firms become insolvent (Pensions Act 2005).
Some of the details of the way the fund will operate have still to be finalized.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and roughly quantify some of the
main policy issues involved in the establishment of such a fund.
One key issue is the future solvency of the PPF, and possible claims on
the public purse. The largest and best established exemplar of a Protection
Fund is the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) of the USA.
After a run of years of very low claims—claims over the period 1980–99
averaged $300 m/year—the PBGC has now faced some very large claims.
In the period 2000–4, shortfalls amounted to some $21 billion in total. Its
2004 accounts show a deficit of $23.3 billion, taking account of probable
claims from currently insured plans. The total underfunding of US pension
plans covered by the PBGC increased from less than $30 billion in 1999 to
more than $450 billion in 2004, as a result of interest rate changes and poor
equity market performance (PBGC 2004). With premium income of $1.5
billion per year, and strong opposition in the Congress to raising premium
levels substantially, it is questionable whether the PBGC will be able to meet
its obligations without government support.
In this chapter, we model a generic plan to help analyze the extent to
which these problems are inherent to a fund to protect DB pensions.
Recognizing that corporate pensions are similar to corporate debt obligations, we show that the PPF is likely to face many years of low claims
interspersed irregularly with periods of very large claims when prolonged
weakness in equity markets coincide with widespread corporate insolvencies. We argue that it will not be possible to build up sufficient surpluses in
the PPF in the good years to pay for the bad years. It will also be difficult to
raise premiums sufficiently after a run of bad years to bring the PPF back
to solvency. The government will not be able to let the PPF default, so it will
be underwritten by the government whether the guarantee is recognized
formally or not.
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We consider, and reject, the argument that the problem can be mitigated
by levying ‘risk-based’ premia.2 They will have a limited impact on moral
hazard. What they will do, however, is ensure that the burden of making
good any deficit in the PPF will fall particularly on those schemes least able
to bear it, making it more difficult to keep the PPF solvent, and increasing
the likelihood of recourse to government. We also investigate the relation
between the PPF and solvency requirements. The issue of pension default
was the major focus of the Goode Report in 1994 set up by the British
government following the theft by Robert Maxwell, Chairman of Mirror
Group Newspapers, of the assets of its pension fund. The Goode Report
considered, and rejected, the idea of a PPF. Instead, it recommended the
introduction of a funding requirement to help ensure that there would be
adequate assets in the pension fund to meet liabilities if the employer
became insolvent or closed the fund for other reasons. This was subsequently introduced by the Pensions Act 1995 as the minimum funding
requirement (MFR). Following criticism of its inflexibility and its distorting
effect on pension fund investment, the government decided to withdraw
the MFR. We argue that the need to protect the finances of the PPF will
require constraints on scheme funding that are very similar to those imposed by a strong solvency-based MFR.
To address these issues, we develop a simple model of a pension plan. In
its simplest form, company insolvency is a random (Poisson) event with a
constant hazard rate. If the firm becomes insolvent, any deficit in the
pension plan is picked up by the PPF. The contribution of the firm to
the pension plan follows a simple smoothing rule that ensures that any
deficits and surpluses are amortized over a number of years. Plan solvency
varies because of the mismatch between the assets and liabilities; the assets
are partly invested in equities, while the liabilities are bondlike. The investment policy and the contribution policy are exogenous. The model shows
how the premium the PPF needs to charge to remain solvent depends on
key parameters such as the investment policy of the pension plan, the
contribution policy, the equity risk premium, and so on. The model is
also used to dynamically simulate the behavior of claims over time.
We also develop a more sophisticated model in which the default rate is
stochastic. Since a downturn in equity markets will not only increase
pension fund deficits, but will also tend to be accompanied by an increase
in insolvencies, the stochastic default model shows much greater volatility
in the claims on the PPF. To model the default rate, we treat the PPF
insurance as a guarantee of a corporate debt obligation, the firm’s pension
promise to its employees. We use a structural model of the firm, based on
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), where the firm’s assets follow a
stochastic process, and the firm defaults when its leverage ratio reaches
a critical level. With defaults being correlated across firms (because of the
positive correlation in asset values across firms), the claims process is much
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more volatile than with Poisson default. With default being correlated with
deficits in pension plans (because the assets of the firm are positively
correlated with the assets of the pension plan), the claims level also becomes much larger.
The original paper on the topic of pension guarantees was by Marcus
(1987), who also used an options framework to value pension insurance; in
many respects, our model builds on his work. While he computes the value
of insurance on a fixed portfolio of risks, which evolve with time in a
nonstationary way, we compute the value of insurance for a steady-state
population of firms. We choose to model firm funding policy in a way
which ensures that firm assumptions about the equity risk premium enter
into the steady-state risk-neutral density of firm solvency ratios. In common
with other more recent work by Pennacchi and Lewis (1994) and Lewis and
Cooperstein (1993), we assume that the pension protection fund does not
receive the pension surplus if a firm declares bankruptcy and does not have
any claim on the assets of a bankrupt firm.
The models we use take the firm’s policy as exogenous. We also discuss
how the existence of the PPF provides incentives may affect behavior—the
moral hazard issue. We examine the consequences of varying premia
according to the solvency of the pension fund, and the credit standing of
the employer. For risk-based premia to have any significant impact on the
future solvency of the PPF, they need to create a strong financial incentive
on weak sponsors to fully fund their plans and to reduce the mismatch
between assets and liabilities.

The Nature of Pension Liabilities and Claims on the PPF
In this section, we discuss the nature of the claims on the PPF in order to
explain and motivate the model we will be using. Our main concern is with
the factors determining the level of the premium to be charged and the
pattern of claims over time. We model a representative firm and its pension
plan. The investment policy of the plan and the contribution policy of the
firm are exogenous; later, we consider how they may be affected by
the existence of the PPF.
Firms offering DB pensions to their employees are obliged to fund
their obligations. The adequacy of the pension fund is reviewed every
three years by an independent actuary who recommends to the trustees
the level of future contributions required to ensure that the fund is able to
meet its liabilities on a continuing basis. The actuarial valuation of the fund
is not related to solvency—ensuring that the assets of the plan exceed its
liabilities—but rather to funding—setting a smooth path for contributions
that will over the long term allow the plan to pay the promised pensions.
In deciding whether a DB plan is adequately funded, the actuary must
make judgments about future investment returns, though they are
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irrelevant to solvency. So a DB scheme that is technically fully funded may
actually be in substantial deficit.3 That does not mean it will not meet its
obligations, but it will need ongoing support from the employer to be sure
of doing so.
If the plan is underfunded, the actuary will recommend an increased
level of contributions that will, assuming reasonable investment performance, allow it to become fully funded in a number of years. The relation
between the sponsoring firm’s financial state and its contribution policy is
complex. On the one hand, a firm facing financial distress may be particularly inclined to defer contributions; on the other hand, it is precisely in
these cases where a rapid return to fund solvency is of greatest importance
to pensioners. Recent evidence on the relationship between pension fund
solvency and the financial status of sponsoring firms is difficult to find. In
the USA, Bodie et al. (1985) reported a negative relationship between the
credit rating of a firm and the solvency of its pension plan in weaker firms.
Orszag (2004), however, found little evidence that weaker UK firms systematically underfund their pension plans.
The distribution of pension liabilities and underfunding in the UK can
be seen in Table 7-1. It shows the median funding ratio, the total pension
Table 7-1 Total UK DB Pension Liabilities for FTSE-350 Companies
S&P
credit rating

Number of
companies

UK pension liability
(FRS17, £mil)

Unfunded
UK pension liability
(FRS17, £mil)

Median plan
funding ratio

AAþ
AA
AA
Aþ
A
A
BBBþ
BBB
BBB
BBþ
BB
Not rated

2
5
5
12
10
12
13
14
7
2
3
163

11,816
21,184
14,743
32,225
21,145
55,230
13,228
18,977
12,760
3,784
8,711
63,886

523
3,349
3,267
5,801
4,187
14,539
3,325
2,427
1,730
453
503
14,180

0.91
0.87
0.76
0.74
0.82
0.78
0.74
0.81
0.84
0.85
0.79
0.70

Total

248

277,689

54,285

0.73

Source: Authors’ calculations using Watson Wyatt Pension Risk Database on published
accounts for the company financial year ending between June 2002 and May 2003.
Notes: Liability figures are in millions of pounds, calculated on the FRS17 basis reported in
the accounts and include only UK liabilities. Figures include only those companies in the
FTSE 350 which have DB plan liabilities. The credit rating is as reported by Standard and
Poor’s at the date of the accounts.
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liability, and the total unfunded pension liability for all FTSE-350
companies with DB pensions. It is derived from the FRS17 disclosures in
their accounts for fiscal year 2002/3.4 Several patterns can be noted. First,
the majority of pension liabilities (67 percent) and pension underfunding
(69 percent) is with companies rated BBB or above, even making the
conservative assumption that all nonrated companies have true credit
ratings below BBB. The third column shows the median funding ratio in
each rating category. There is no clear trend in funding as the credit
strength of the sponsoring firm declines.
In the light of this, and to keep the model simple, we take the contribution policy to be independent of the firm’s financial state, and to depend
only on the plan’s solvency level so that, over the long term, the assets equal
the liabilities, although we later make allowance for the fact that pension
plans may fund to a different standard.
The potential for a large deficit when an employer becomes insolvent
depends on the investment policy of the pension plan. The plan’s liabilities
resemble a long-dated inflation-indexed bond. The assets of UK pension
plans are typically at least 50 percent invested in equities. One might expect
trustees of plans that are more precarious (larger deficits, weaker employers) to be more cautious about protecting their solvency, but the evidence
does not bear this out. Table 7-2 shows the average equity proportion of a
variety of types of fund and finds no strong relationship, except that plans
that are less well funded appear to invest slightly more heavily in equities.
In our model, we assume that the asset mix of the pension fund is constant.
It is clear that the level of claims on the PPF is heavily dependent on the
mismatch between the assets and liabilities of pension plans, and the speed
with which any over- or underfunding is corrected. The time profile of
claims on the Fund will closely reflect the performance of the equity
market, with a prolonged downturn leading to widespread underfunding,
and large claims when firms become insolvent.
Table 7-2 Average Equity Proportion in Pension Fund Asset Portfolio for
Different Pension Plan Types

Pension plan assets/Pension plan FRS17 liabilities
Pension plan FRS17 liabilities/Company market capitalization
Book value of company debt/Company market capitalization
Company market capitalization/Book value of firm assets

Below
median

Above
median

0.72
0.68
0.66
0.65

0.58
0.62
0.63
0.65

Source: Authors’ calculations using Watson Wyatt Pension Risk Database.
Notes: Each cell shows the proportion of the plans assets invested in equities for plans below
and above the median value of each plan variable. Means differ as not all data are available
for every company.
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Modeling the Guarantee
In what follows we describe the model in outline; a detailed description
appears in the Appendix. The PPF we model guarantees the pension
liabilities of a set of firms. In this section, we assume that there is an infinite
number of small, identical firms, and focus on one representative firm.
The insolvency of a firm is modeled as a Poisson process, so a constant
fraction of the firms becomes insolvent in each period. The present
value of the accrued liabilities of a scheme but we assume that it is
nonstochastic.
The assets of the pension plan comprise a riskless bond with constant
interest rate, and an equity portfolio. We assume that each plan invests in
the same market index fund. Equity returns are risky and attract a risk
premium. The pension scheme receives contributions and pays out pensions. We assume a simple rule for determining the level of contributions
that increases the level of contributions the greater the degree of underfunding in the scheme. If the firm becomes insolvent, and if the guaranteed liabilities of the plan at that time exceed the assets, the PPF pays the
difference. The expenditure of the PPF in a period in the model is the
equal to the sum of the deficits of the schemes whose sponsors become
insolvent in the period.
So far as the income of the PPF is concerned, there are many possible
ways of levying the premium. The PBGC uses a combination of a charge per
member covered and a charge proportional to the dollar size of any deficit
in the scheme. In the UK, the PPF is required to take account of other
matters including the solvency of the scheme sponsor. We do not address
the question of the optimum premium schedule directly. For the present,
we assume that the premium is a constant proportion of the scheme’s
liabilities.
We wish to equate the present value of future claims on the PPF with the
present value of its premium income in steady state. The simple market we
model is complete—the only stochastic component in the revenue and
expenditure of the PPF is the return on the equity market—so both assets
and liabilities can be valued using standard contingent pricing arguments.
We show in the Appendix that the fair premium level, measured in dollars
per dollar of insured liabilities is a function of seven parameters:
. a
^, the market risk premium assumed by the scheme in determining
contributions
. sm , the volatility of the market
. d, the bankruptcy hazard rate of the sponsor company
. a*, the maximum permitted funding ratio
. x, the equity proportion in the fund
. T, the time over which fund deficits are amortized
. l, the proportion of liabilities that are guaranteed
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Estimating the Model. For the purposes of our analysis we take a
^ ¼ 6% and
s ¼ 18%. The probability of the firm becoming insolvent, d, is difficult to
estimate. Using Moody’s global database on long-term default rates by
rating category for 1983–2003 (Hamilton et al. 2004, Exhibit 31), we apply
it to the observed credit-rate distribution of UK pension liabilities. Table 7-1
implies a 10-year cumulative default rate of 2.95 percent, corresponding to
an annual rate of 0.30 percent. This may be too high as a long-term estimate
since it takes as its base ratings in 2002/3 when the corporate sector was in a
financially weak state. Also, a firm that defaults on its debt may refinance
and continue without defaulting on its pension obligations. On the other
hand, the Moody’s data apply only to rated companies; by contrast, the PPF
insures plans of companies that are not rated, and the latter are likely to
have, on average, higher probability of default. In the light of this, we take d
to be 0.25 percent per year. Consistent with the observed behavior of
pension schemes, we take as our central case a maximum funding ratio a*
of 120 percent, an equity proportion of 2/3, a 10-year amortization period
(T), and we assume that the PPF liabilities are 90 percent of liabilities
assumed for funding purposes (so l ¼ 0:9). Since these parameters will
vary between pension schemes, we also conduct sensitivity analysis.
Table 7-3 explores the effects of varying the investment strategy (as
measured by x) and the funding strategy (as measured by T ) on the size
of the premium. In the base case, the premium level is £0.50/£1,000 of
liability.5 The difficulty of estimating the mean default rate means that the
absolute level of premium that we obtain from our model should be treated
with great caution. But since the premium is directly proportional to the

Table 7-3 Premium with Poisson Default (£/year per £1,000 of liabilities)
Equity proportion

Base case
Higher solvency cap: a* ¼ 200% (120%)
Stricter solvency: T ¼ 4 yrs (10)
No assumed risk premium: a
^ ¼ 0% (6%)
Partial guarantee: l ¼ 80% (90%)

1/3

2/3

100%

0.206
0.206
0.044
0.039
0.062

0.497
0.494
0.191
0.171
0.297

0.726
0.716
0.339
0.314
0.510

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The base case shows the unconditional fair value premium for guaranteeing a
pension fund against default when the risk of default is 0.25% per annum, equities have
an expected return of 6% in excess of the risk-free rate, deficits in the fund are made up
over 10 years, and the fund value is not permitted to exceed 120% of liabilities. The
premium is shown as a percentage of liabilities for different investment strategies.
The other lines of the table show how the cost varies as each of the input parameters is
varied. Base-case values are shown in parentheses.
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default rate, the sensitivity of the premium to varying assumptions should
be not be affected by the uncertainty in the default rate
The direction of the sensitivities is as one would expect: the higher the
equity proportion, the larger the premium. Having a higher solvency cap
does reduce the premium because the fund is allowed to build up large
surpluses when the market does well. But the effect is small; raising the cap
on assets from 120 to 200 percent of liabilities, even assuming 100 percent
equity funding, reduces the premium by less than 2 percent.6 Stricter
solvency requirements, as modeled by amortizing deficits over 4 rather
than 10 years, have a very substantial effect, cutting the premium by over
50 percent.
The assumed risk premium has a substantial impact, with a zero-risk
premium cutting the insurance premium by nearly two-thirds in the central
case. This can be interpreted in two ways. The first is as a measure of the
importance of funding policy: if companies, in computing their contribution rate, assume that all their assets would just earn the risk-free interest
rate, they would pay higher contributions for any given level of the solvency
ratio, and so would on average achieve a higher solvency ratio. The burden
on the Protection Fund would be lower because of the more conservative
contribution policy, just as it would be with a more rapid amortization
policy. A second interpretation is to see it as a measure of the importance
of the price of risk in setting a fair insurance premium. The premium
computed using a zero-risk premium is the same as the expected rate of
claims (under the objective measure) when the true and assumed risk
premium coincide. Taking the base case with 2/3 equity, the table shows
that while the fair premium is 0.050 percent of liabilities each year, the
(objective) expected rate of claims is about one-third of that level, at only
0.017 percent of liabilities each year. The difference between the two arises
because claims on the Fund are most likely to occur when the market
declines, and the cost of insuring against bad states of the world is higher
than the objective probability of those states occurring.
The bottom line of Table 7-3 shows that restricting the guarantee to 80
rather than 90 percent of liabilities, while retaining the PPF’s senior claim
on all a pension plan’s assets, also reduces the premium significantly. This
is not only because the sum guaranteed is smaller, but because the first part
of any deficit in the pension plan falls fully on the beneficiaries. With 2/3
equity, the effect of restricting the guarantee to 80 percent of liabilities
reduces the premium per dollar of pension liabilities by 40 percent.

A Structural Model of Default Rates
Next, we extend the model to include a stochastic default rate. Allowing for
variable default rates is important for pension plan guarantees, since the
risk of default varies substantially over time and is correlated across firms.
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It is also negatively correlated with the equity market. These facts have
three important implications:
(1) A falling equity market increases both the probability of sponsor
firms becoming insolvent and also the size of pension plan deficits.
So stochastic default induces a positive correlation between the
probability of a claim on the PPF and the size of the claim. This
increases the fair premium.
(2) The correlation between default risk and equity returns means that
default risk is priced. This will further increase the difference between the (objective) expected rate of claims on the Fund and the
fair premium.
(3) The correlation of default risk across firms increases the skewness of
the claims process.
To explore the practical significance of these issues, we need a model of
default that captures correlations across firms and correlations with the
equity market—phenomena not well-captured in the Poisson default
model. We explore three strategies for modeling default: fitting the empirical evidence on default directly, fitting the behavior of corporate debt
spreads, and structural models of the firm. Next, we explain why we prefer
the structural model approach and why we choose mean reverting leverage
à la Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). We then present premium
calculations and claim simulations implied by this model.
Choice of Default Model. The simplest strategy for modeling default is to
take historic default rates, postulate some functional form for their time
series behavior, and estimate a relationship. The problem with this is the
paucity of data. Defaults are rare—fewer than 1500 defaulted issuers are
included in Moody’s database between 1970 and 2003. As shown in Figure
7-1, default rates are highly autocorrelated over time. This is obviously
important for modeling the PPF. But basing a model purely on the
limited empirical data would be hard to do with any reliability. The peaks
in 1990–91 and 2000–02 would drive results.
An alternative approach is to use information from the behavior of credit
spreads. The empirical evidence does strongly support correlations in
changes in credit spread across firms and strong negative correlation
between credit spreads and the equity market. Pedrosa and Roll (1998)
document the existence of strong common factors in credit spreads for
portfolios of credits, where the sixty portfolios in question are characterized
by broad industry group, credit rating category, and maturity. A more
detailed analysis of the spreads on individual US industrial bonds is provided by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). They look at
weekly changes in spreads against comparable Treasury bonds on a universe
of 688 straight (not callable or convertible) bonds from 261 different issuers
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Figure 7-1. Global issuer-weighted default rates, 1970–2003.
Source: Hamilton et al. (2004).

over the period 1988–97. They regress the changes in a number of factors
suggested by theory, including the firm leverage ratio, the level and slope of
the government yield curve, the level and slope of implied volatility on the
equity market, and the level of the equity market. They find that a 1 percent
increase in the S&P500 index is associated with a credit-spread decrease of
about 1.6 basis points. Their regressions explain about 25 percent of spread
changes; by examining the residuals from the regression, they show that 75
percent of the unexplained change can be ascribed to a common factor that
they fail to identify with any other macroeconomic variable. These results
are based on US data, but similar results in the sterling Eurobond market
are obtained by Manzoni (2002) where daily changes in the spread of the
yield on the market index to UK Treasury yields are negatively correlated
with returns on the UK stock market. Over the period 1991–99, a 1 percent
increase in the FTSE 100 index is associated with a credit spread decrease of
2.1 to 3.5 basis points depending on the specification.
Building a model of default that is calibrated to bond prices is attractive
because of the large amount of high quality data on the behavior of bond
yield spreads. But it faces a serious obstacle. There is mounting evidence
(Elton et al. 2001; Huang and Huang 2003) that credit risk accounts for
only a part—according to Huang and Huang, in the case of investment
grade bonds, less than a quarter—of the yield spread. In the absence of any

7 / UK Approach to Insuring DB Pension Plans

119

generally accepted explanation of why the risk-adjusted expected return on
corporate bonds is higher than on default free bonds, the credibility of a
model would be in doubt if it incorporates the whole yield spread in
valuing the pension fund guarantee.
Accordingly, we model the default process from fundamentals, using a
structural model of the firm. Structural models originate with Merton
(1974) who describes a risky bond as a portfolio consisting of riskless
bond and a short position in a put option on the assets of the firm. This
simple idea has been developed by many other authors (Duffie and Singleton 2003 offer an overview). Structural models are widely used as a basis for
pricing credit sensitive instruments though they do not appear to capture
yield spreads on corporate bonds with great accuracy. Nevertheless, Huang
and Huang (2003) show that structural models, when suitably calibrated,
do fit the empirical data on default rather well. For our specific purpose,
structural models have three other advantages: the correlation between
corporate default and the behavior of the equity market arises naturally
within the model; the correlation in default rates across firms arises naturally in the model from the correlation in firms’ asset values; and, unlike
models based on the yield spread, the price of default risk can be computed
within the model, without the need to make any assumptions about the
behavior of recovery rates.
Previously we had a stationary process for pension plan deficits that
allowed us to compute an unconditionally fair insurance premium that is
a constant proportion of the value of insured liabilities. To retain this
feature, we need a structural model of default that is also stationary. The
natural candidate is Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001, hereafter CDG)
who have a model with mean-reverting leverage ratios. As in other structural Merton-type models, debt is a claim on the firm’s assets V. The assets
follow a diffusion process with constant volatility sv , and the firm’s leverage
varies accordingly. But CDG argue that firms tend to adjust their
leverage over time through their financing strategy. This causes the leverage ratio to revert to some target level. The key variable is the log leverage
ratio of the firm, l. The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of the critical
asset level at which default will occur to the current asset level. CDG model
the dynamics of l as a first- order autoregressive process where l reverts to
some long run mean level l̄ with speed k and volatility sv . The correlation
between changes in l and equity market returns is a constant, r.
The log leverage ratio l is strictly negative so long as the firm is solvent; if
it hits zero, the firm defaults. Two additional elements complete the
specification of the model. First, we need to specify the correlation structure of firm asset returns. We assume that each firm’s return is the market
return plus a noise term that is identically and independently distributed
across firms. Second, we assume that idiosyncratic risk is unpriced. Starting
with a portfolio of firms with the same leverage and the same pension
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funding, the pension funding level varies over time with the equity market
but remains the same across firms, while leverage ratios disperse because of
firm idiosyncratic risk. We have now fully specified the processes governing
the claims on the PPF; a more formal presentation appears in the Appendix.
With no new firms being born, the steady-state joint probability function
of the scheme solvency level a and the firm leverage level l is g (a,l)e dt ,
where d is now the steady - state default rate driven by the condition that l ¼ 0
is an absorbing barrier. The results would be unaltered if there is a steady
entry of new firms into the portfolio provided that their distribution in (a, l )
space is the same as the steady-state distribution.
Estimating the Model. To estimate the model, we generally follow Huang
and Huang (2003); their estimates are broadly consistent with CDG. Since
those estimates vary slightly according to the credit rating of the bond in
question, we take their results for an A-rated issuer (Moody’s or S & P’s). In
particular, we take the mean reversion parameter k to be 0.2, the asset
volatility sv to be 24.5 percent and the asset risk premium 4.89 percent.
Huang and Huang show this is consistent with an equity premium for the
firm of 5.99 percent. Taking the equity b to be one, the market risk
premium is also 5.99 percent, and the asset b is 0.82. Using an equity
market volatility sm of 18 percent, the correlation between the change in
firm asset value and the equity market return is r ¼ b ssmv ¼ 0:60.
Using Huang and Huang’s estimate of the long-term average leverage
ratio of 38 percent gives a long-run average default rate of 0.75 percent per
year. For the reasons already discussed, this looks very high, so we use an
average leverage ratio of 31.7 percent; this gives a long-run default rate of
0.25 percent per year. We compute the steady-state joint density of the
solvency ratio a and the leverage ratio l using a two-dimensional binomial
tree with births and deaths, and iterate forward in time until the default
rate and rate of claims on the fund converge to their limiting values. In all
the iterations, we use a time step of 0.1 year.
Table 7-4 shows the premium and expected claims rate for a variety of
parameter values. Using the same base-case parameters as before (2/3 of
the pension fund invested in equity, 120 percent ceiling on overfunding,
10-year deficit amortization period, 90 percent of liabilities guaranteed),
the average rate of claims is calculated to be £0.68/£1,000 of liabilities per
year. This compares with a claims rate of £0.17/£1,000 in Table 7-3 with a
Poisson default process. This fourfold increase in claims is entirely attributable to adding a correlation between corporate defaults and pension
underfunding in the structural model.
The impact of the structural default model on the premium is still
greater. With Poisson default, the fair premium in Table 7-3 was £0.50/
£1,000. In the structural default model, it is more than seven times as high,
at £3.90/£1,000. The other two rows of the table show that the level of
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Table 7-4 Premium and Average Claims with Structural Default (£/year per
£1,000 of liabilities)
2/3

Equity proportion (x):

Poisson default
Structural default:
Base case
l ¼ 80% (90%)
T ¼ 4 (10)

100%

Premium

Claim

Premium

Claim

0.50

0.17

0.73

0.31

3.90
2.86
2.34

0.68
0.45
0.43

5.23
4.19
3.50

1.01
0.77
0.70

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The Poisson default case is from Table 7-3. The Structural Default model base case
has the same dynamics for the solvency ratio as the Poisson model; the two also have the
same expected default rate (0.245%). The first variant on the base case has only 80% of
liabilities guaranteed by the PPF, and the second has an amortization period for pension
fund deficits of 4 years rather than 10. The other parameters of the models are: a* ¼ 120%,
sm ¼ 18%, sv ¼ 24.5%, l̄ ¼ 1.15, k ¼ 0.2, and r ¼ 0.6.

premiums, and the average rate of claim, can be reduced significantly by
limiting the proportion of liabilities guaranteed (with the PPF retaining
first claim on all the assets of the pension fund), and by stricter pension
fund solvency requirements.
Evidently, fair premium levels are substantially higher than those envisaged for the PPF. It is difficult to compare our calculated premia with
actual premia charged by the US PBGC, as the latter depend on actual
pension underfunding while our calculations assume a steady-state distribution of funding and firm leverage. In any event, in fiscal 2004, the PBGC
collected $1,481 million in premia on its single-employer program. Guaranteed liabilities amounted to $1.35 trillion in 2001 (the latest date for
which figures are available; PBGC 2003) and the premium amounted to
$1.10 per $1,000 of liability. Our calculated premium is thus more than
three times greater than the PBGC premium, yet our expected claims are
roughly half. We caution that it would be wrong to attach too much
importance to the absolute numbers, as they are sensitive to model parameters, in particular to the assumptions concerning the long-run average
leverage ratio. Using Huang and Huang’s estimate of 38 percent, rather
than the value we have used of 31.65 percent, would imply fair premia that
are more than twice as high.
Claims Distribution. Thus far we have established the average level of
claims in the long run, reflecting the average long-run claims experience
of the PPF. Of course the variation in the claims level is also a matter of
considerable concern. To investigate the variation in the claims level, we
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simulate the claims process, and ask: how high a claims rate can one
reasonably expect over a period of say thirty years? To address this point,
simulations are carried out with the same base case as Table 7-4, using the
structural default model, and an equity proportion of 2/3. As in Table 7-4,
the fair premium is £3.90/£1,000 of liabilities, while the expected level of
claims is £0.68/£1,000.
Table 7-5 shows the distribution of the thirty-year worst case, using
objective probabilities; it is based on 1,000 simulations, with a time step
of one-tenth of a year. The simulations start with the steady-state distribution of firm leverage and pension fund solvency. A path for the equity
market is then simulated. The liabilities of schemes grow at a constant rate
equal to the average rate of insolvency, so ensuring that the level of insured
liabilities is stationary. Since the pension assets of all firms are perfectly
correlated, and deficits are corrected by adjusting contribution policy, the
initial dispersion in pension funding levels across firms quickly narrows.
Firm asset value is subject to idiosyncratic risk, so while there is comovement, there is also substantial dispersion. In running the simulations, the
first seventy years are used as a conditioning period, and the following
thirty years are then used as the sample period. The conditioning period is
needed to ensure that the start of the sample period is suitably randomized.
For comparison, we also show comparable figures for the Poisson default
case. The claims are expressed as a percentage of the average size of
liabilities over the thirty-year period.
The table shows how the structural model of default not only increases
the magnitude of average claims, but also greatly increases their skewness.
In the Poisson model, the level of claims in the worst year in thirty was just
over three times the average claim level in the median case. By contrast, the
Table 7-5 Claims/£1,000 in Worst Period in 30 Years (simulation)
Structural default
Fair premium
Average claim
Median
Top quartile
Top decile

Poisson default

3.90
0.68
1 year
4.1
11.5
24.1

0.50
0.17
5 years
6.9
19.2
42.8

1 year
0.59
0.74
0.87

5 years
2.1
2.9
3.6

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table is based on 1,000 simulations of the evolution of the distribution of firm
leverage and solvency level for the population of insured firms, and shows the average
and peak annual claim level over each 30-year period. The parameter values for the base
case are: a* ¼ 120%, T ¼ 10, l ¼ 90%, b ¼ 1, sm ¼ 18%, sv ¼ 24.5%, l̄ ¼1.15, k ¼ 0.2, and
r ¼ 0.6. The Poisson default case is identical except that r ¼ 0.
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structural default model has a ratio in excess of six. In the worst decile of
30-year period, the contrast is even starker: with Poisson default, the ratio is
about 5, while with structural default the ratio is well over 30. The effect is
strongly visible even looking at five-year periods, with the worst five-year
period being comparable to twice the worst single-year experience.
While it would be wrong to attach much precision to the numbers—
these are rare and extreme events—the results of the simulation do illustrate the extent to which correlated defaults across firms, and the correlation between the mean default rate and the equity market, may create
considerable skewness in claims experience. This has important implications for the setting of premia. If the PPF seeks to build up reserves
sufficient to meet claims in the worst year in 30 years with 90 percent
probability, Table 7-5 suggests it would need to have reserves in excess of
24 years of average claims, or roughly 2.5 percent of insured liabilities. It is
difficult to believe that agreement could be reached on setting the level of
premiums necessary to build up such a high level of reserves.
In the absence of such reserves and of any support from government, the
PPF would need to borrow to pay claims, using its future premium income
as collateral. But this alternative looks barely more palatable, since it would
require premia to be raised very substantially. If, for example, there were
claims equal to 2.5 percent of liabilities in 1 year, and they were met by
borrowing that had to be repaid over 10 years, then additional premia
equal to nearly four times the normal average claims level would need to
be charged to repay the debt, ignoring any real interest due on the debt.
This high premium would have to be charged at a time when, by assumption, the solvent firms that remain are heavily leveraged, and themselves
have pension funds in substantial deficit.
If the PPF cannot weather extreme events either by way of reserves or by
way of borrowing backed by increased premia, then that leaves two alternatives: default or some form of government involvement. The PPF will
have powers to reduce the amount guaranteed under extreme circumstances, but this is a route that is fraught with problems. The very name of the
fund, and the fact that the government has frequently stated that it has
acted to restore confidence in the pensions promise7 means that it will be
very difficult politically for a government to allow the PPF to significantly
reduce its commitment. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the government will be left as the final guarantor of DB pensions.

Cross Subsidy and Moral Hazard
In our base case, the fair insurance premium is £3.90/£1,000 of insured
liabilities per year, and the expected claim level is £0.68 per year. This is not
a deadweight loss to pension plans. The total cost of the premia to all
pension plans is exactly matched by the gains to pensioners in failed

124

David McCarthy and Anthony Neuberger

pension plans. But for individual firms, the benefits and costs will not
match. For pensioners of firms with high credit ratings, the probability of
default is very small, and for them (or their employers), the PPF represents,
in effect, a significant tax from which they derive little benefit. Since it is a
tax just on DB pensions, it will tend to discourage the provision of such
pensions.
As yet, we have assumed that the existence of the PPF and the way that its
premiums are set has no effect on pension fund investment strategy and
plan sponsors’ contribution/benefit policy. But there is reason to doubt
these assumptions. The difference between the costs and the benefits of
the PPF insurance at the fund level creates incentives for firms to maximize
the net value of their own PPF cover, with potential consequences for the
solvency of the PPF as a whole. For instance, members and firms receive the
benefits of a risky investment strategy, but the costs may be paid by the PPF.
Therefore, trustees have an incentive to follow a riskier investment strategy
than they would otherwise. Weaker firms might find that an underfunded
pension plan—effectively a loan from employees guaranteed by the PPF—
is cheaper than a loan from the markets and has no consequence for
pension fund members because it is guaranteed by the PPF. The PPF
could thus become a source of subsidized financing for unscrupulous
firms. Firms may also collude with employees to increase pension benefits—
guaranteed by the PPF—in lieu of current wages, effectively a joint raid on
the PPF. Firms may also alter the relative funding of their pension plans to
take into account benefit limits on the PPF. The list of opportunities for
dishonest behavior is limited only by the imagination of firms and their
advisors, as pointed out by two ex-PBGC Executive Directors (Kandarian
2003; Utgoff 1993).
Our model can be used to assess the size of incentives for bad behavior if
we assume that the PPF charges our constant base-case premium of £3.90/
£1,000 of liability to all firms. In our model, a firm that invested its pension
assets entirely in bonds would never be underfunded and so would derive
no value from the PPF insurance. It would therefore suffer a loss of £3.90/
£1,000 of liability per year. A firm which invested its assets entirely in
equities, on the other hand, would receive pension insurance with a value
of £5.23/£1,000 per year, but would pay only £3.90, hence receiving an
annual windfall of £1.33/£1,000 of liability. Similarly, a firm which maintained full pension funding at all times would derive no value from pension
insurance but would pay £3.90/£1,000 of liability. A firm which amortized
any surpluses and deficits over four instead of ten years—a stricter funding
standard than the base case—would value the PPF insurance at only £2.34/
£1,000 per year, but would pay £3.90/£1,000—a loss of £1.44/£1,000 of
liability per year. Similarly, firms with an average leverage ratio of 38
percent (these firms would be financially weaker than our base-case
firms, which have an average leverage ratio of 31.6 percent), would value
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insurance at £8.20/£1,000 per year and pay £3.90—and hence would pay
less than half the fair premium.
One way of reducing these transfers would be to set premia for guaranteeing pensions that more closely reflect their risk level. The PPF is required by law to ensure that 80 percent of the premium is ‘risk-rated’,
related to factors such as the degree of pension underfunding, pension
investment policy, and the strength of the corporate sponsor. Although
risk-rating with these factors would remove some of the moral hazards
associated with the PPF, it would probably do little to control the extreme
lumpiness of the claims process pointed out in the previous section. We
have already seen that, in the absence of the PPF, schemes are heavily
invested in equities and are often seriously underfunded. As Table 7-4
shows, the value of the PPF to a sponsor and the beneficiaries are greater,
the more the equity investment and the less strict the funding. Consequently, considerable risk-rating in setting the premium would be necessary just to offset these benefits.
The lumpiness of the claims process can only be mitigated by forcing
financially weak sponsors to ensure their schemes are fully funded. The
premiums required to do this are large. In the absence of premium penalties, underfunding a pension scheme is similar to borrowing from the
scheme at the riskless rate to fund the business. To induce a sponsor to
put additional money into a scheme, the penalty on maintaining a deficit
needs to be of the same order as the borrowing spread the sponsor would
pay. Similarly, in order to induce firms to switch from equities into bonds,
the penalty on equity investment would need to be of the same order as the
equity risk premium—up to 6 percent per annum of the amount invested
in equities.
So risk-related premiums may improve fairness by ensuring that those
schemes benefiting most from the PPF pay more toward its cost, but they
will do little to reduce the probability of very high claims unless they lead to
radical changes in the level of contributions and investment policy. Indeed,
risk-related premia may make it more likely that a run of bad years could
force government intervention. For if, as we have argued, the PPF will be
unable to build up large reserves, and if it is unlikely in practice to cut back
benefits, then the only way it can react to a run of bad years is to raise
premiums. But the constraint on raising premiums is the damage it does to
companies and to employment. The pressure to raise premiums will be
particularly acute if premia bear more heavily on the highest risk sponsors,
since these are precisely the companies where raising premiums is most
likely to cause financial distress.
In order for the PPF to work effectively, something other than risk-rating
may well be required. A strong MFR on a transparent basis will effectively
control underfunding, and hence claims on the PPF. The PPF itself will
have to lay down precise rules for computing the solvency ratio, and could
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not allow pension funds leeway in making their own assumptions. Further,
the PPF could cut back on the level of guaranteed benefits without changing the funding process. Under current legislation, the PPF guarantees
only 90 percent of deferred pensions, there is a cap on the amount of each
pension that is protected, and some pension increases are not covered by
the PPF. Lowering the level of guaranteed benefits will have a significant
effect on the cost of insurance to pension funds and, eventually, to the
taxpayer but will not reduce the volatility of claims.

Conclusions
Our analysis illustrates some of the problems that may be faced by PPF, and
we offer way to adapt the design of such a guarantee fund to rectify these
problems. Although failure of pension plans to pay people their entitlements have been unusual in the UK, it would be dangerous and wrong to
conclude that failures will be rare and small in the future. The way that
pension schemes are funded, and the way that funds are invested, imply
that a deep and prolonged decline in financial markets could readily lead
to widespread failure. An inherent feature of the claims process facing the
PPF is likely to be that many years of small claims will be interspersed with
rare and unpredictable periods of exceedingly large claims. These periods
will coincide with periods when the stability of the whole of the financial
sector is under maximum strain.
Though we do not claim to have a very accurate or even a practical
method of determining fair premiums, our models imply that the magnitude of the claims in these unstable periods will be so large that it will not
be politically feasible or economically sensible to build up reserves to meet
them. When such a crisis does occur, it may well be impossible to meet
claims by a steep increase in the levy on employers since they will simultaneously be facing heavy financial demands to rebuild their own depleted
pension funds. There may be little alternative to having the government
step in, even though in the UK case, the government has repeatedly made
clear that it will not guarantee the PPF. Consequently, a substantial part of
the cost of the scheme will actually fall to the taxpayer. Further, the PPF will
necessarily involve large transfers from companies that are unlikely to
default to companies that may well default. These transfers are inefficient,
and create opportunities for moral hazard.
To minimize the cost of the insurance and to keep down the level of
cross-subsidy, the government has argued that the PPF must risk-rate its
premiums. We argue that risk-rated premia will need to be sufficiently steep
to alter the current investment and funding policy of UK pension plans if
they are to have a significant impact. Premium risk-rating may need to be
implemented in tandem with a strong minimum funding ratio, to reduce
the potential cost of the PPF to future UK taxpayers.
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Our model is necessarily simplistic, but we note that the assumptions we
make tend to underplay the nature of the problem. That is, we model the
liabilities as a continuum of small plans, which therefore ignores the
lumpiness in claims that comes from a large plan failing. We also assume
zero correlation in the idiosyncratic risk of companies, and so we take no
account of whole industries facing financial distress. We have set aside the
problems that might arise if the PPF fails to match the assets and liabilities
of the defaulted plans it is managing. If the fund were to invest in equities,
the volatility in the PPF’s net worth would be further increased. Finally, we
assume that the only systemic risk affecting the sector is equity market risk;
other risks, such as unpredicted changes in interest rates and longevity,
could further increase volatility of claims on the PPF. Integrating these
elements is a task for future research.

Appendix: Modeling the Pension Guarantee
Our model assumes that the PPF guarantees the pension liabilities of a
continuum of small, identical firms, and focuses on one representative firm.

The Poisson Case
The insolvency of a firm is first taken to follow a Poisson process with
hazard rate d. With d being constant and default risk uncorrelated across
firms, each firm faces a constant and equal probability of default in each
time period. With an infinite number of firms, a constant fraction ddt of the
firms become insolvent in each period dt. The present value of the accrued
liabilities of the firm’s pension plan at time t, denoted by Lt , may vary over
time, but is assumed to be nonstochastic. The assets of the plan have value
At . If the firm becomes insolvent at time t, and if the guaranteed liabilities
of the plan exceed the assets, the PPF pays Lt  At .
In practice, pension plan liabilities are measured in several different
ways. For the purpose of this model, Lt should be interpreted as the cost
at time t of buying out the guaranteed liabilities of the pension plan at that
time, and At is the market value of the assets of the plan, after allowing for
any costs of winding up. Implicitly, we are assuming that if the firm becomes insolvent, the PPF has full access to the assets of the pension plan, at
least so far as they do not exceed the guaranteed liabilities, but no access to
the assets of the firm itself. By topping up the pension plan’s assets to equal
its liabilities, the PPF can ensure that there is no further claim on the PPF
from that pension plan.
The assets of the pension plan comprise a riskless bond with constant
interest rate r, and an equity portfolio. We assume that each plan invests in
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the same market index fund, which may be assumed to be the portfolio of
all available equities, weighted in proportion to their market capitalization.
We assume that the instantaneous return on the market portfolio, dS/S,
follows an Ito process:
dS
¼ (r þ a)dt þ sm dzm ,
S

(1)

where zm is a standard Brownian process, a the market risk premium, and
sm the volatility of the market.
We wish to compute the present value of future claims on the PPF. The
claims are stochastic, and depend on future stock market performance.
Rather than compute the expected level of future claims, and taking their
present value by discounting back to the present at a suitably chosen
discount rate that reflects the riskiness of the cash flows, we use the riskneutral methodology that is standard in the finance literature. Where, as in
our model, all risks are hedgeable,8 present values can be obtained by
projecting future outcomes using a pricing or risk-neutral pricing measure
Q in place of the objective probability measure, and discounting the
expected claims using the risk-free interest rate. The risk-neutral probability measure is that measure under which all the assets have an expected
return equal to the risk-free rate. Hence, Equation (1) can be rewritten as
dS
¼ rdt þ sm dzmQ ,
S

(2)

Q

where dzm is a standard Brownian motion process under measure Q. Setting
the right-hand sides of Equations (1) and (2) equal, we can derive an
Q
expression for dzm in terms of dzm :
dzmQ ¼

a
dt þ dzm :
sm

(3)

Q

The expected value of dzm under measure Q is 0, so taking expectations
of both sides under the risk-neutral measure Q gives
E Q [dzm ] ¼ 

a
dt
sm

(4)

It is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the firm is still solvent at
time t, and 0 otherwise. If the firm becomes insolvent, the pension plan is
closed. If the firm becomes insolvent at time t (so dIt ¼ 1) and if the
pension fund is in surplus at that time (Lt # At ) then the pension plan is
able to pay pensions due in full, and no liability falls on the Protection
Fund.9 If there is a deficit in the pension plan when the firm becomes
insolvent, the Protection Fund takes over both the assets and the liabilities.
The cost to the Fund at the time the firm becomes insolvent is thus:
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[Lu  Au ]þ dIu

where [x]þ  Max (x,0):
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(5)

t

Determining the Premium. The firm pays an insurance premium Pt to the PPF.
From the Fund’s perspective, insuring the plan has a present value equal to
the expected value of the premiums paid by the firm when it is solvent, less
the expected value of the payments that the PPF will have to make if a firm
defaults, both discounted at the risk-free rate. We take expectations using the
risk-neutral measure Q to ensure that the value obtained takes proper
account of the risk in the Fund’s premiums and its liabilities:
E

Q

ð 1
Pu Iu e

r (ut)

du þ

t

ð1

þ r (ut)

[Lu  Au ] e


dIu :

(6)

t

If the PPF is to be able to cover the cost of claims from its premium
income then, ignoring administrative costs, the present value of premium
income less claims must be 0. Hence, any premium must satisfy the condition:
ð 1

ð1
Q
r (ut)
þ r (ut)
Pu I u e
du þ
[Lu Au ] e
dIu ¼ 0
(7)
E
t

t

In principle, there are many ways of levying the premium. We do not
address the question of the optimum premium schedule directly. For the
present, we assume that the premium is a constant proportion of the
scheme’s liabilities.
If the premium is levied at rate p:
Pt ¼ pLt :

(8)

From (7), using the Poisson default rate process and the nonstochastic
nature of the liabilities, the rate p is given by:
Ð1
p ¼

t

Q

Et [d(1  Au =Lu )]þ Lu e (r þd)(ut) du
Ð1
:
(r þd)(ut) du
t Lu e

(9)

Modeling default as a Poisson event among a continuum of atomistic
schemes with uncorrelated default rates ensures that a constant proportion
ddu of plans become insolvent in each time period du. This gives rise to the
d inside the expectation term. The d in the discount factor reflects the fact
that the number of plans is declining at rate d because of insolvencies. The
premium rate is a weighted average of the expected claim rate into the
future. It depends on the current solvency level of the scheme. The main
focus of this chapter is on the impact of different contribution schedules,
investment policies, and guarantee arrangements on the level of the premium. To abstract from variations caused by initial conditions, we look at
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processes that generate stationary distributions of insolvency rates and
deficit levels, and take unconditional expectations.
With unconditional expectations, Equation (9) simplifies to:
p ¼ E Q [d(1 

Au þ
)] :
Lu

(10)

The Dynamics of Scheme Solvency. In order to evaluate the expectation in
Equation (10), we need to specify the dynamics of the scheme solvency
ratio Au =Lu under the risk-neutral measure Q. The dynamics of A depend
on the return on the portfolio, outflows to pensioners, and inflows from
contributions. Again, written as an Ito process, we have:
dA ¼ [(r þ xa)A þ (kt  pt )]dt þ xsm Adzm ,

(11)

where x is the (fixed) proportion of the assets held as equity, k the
contribution rate, and p the rate of pay out to pensioners. The first
component of the dt term states that the expected rate of return on the
assets is the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium on the equities held
by the plan. The second component shows that the assets increase at rate k
because of contributions to the fund and decrease at rate p because of
payments to pensioners. As before, the dz term has zero expected value and
models how the value of the assets changes as a result of random fluctuations in the value of the equities held by the fund.
The firm’s contribution to the pension plan has two components: the
first maintains the current solvency level after allowing for payments to
pensioners, any change in net liabilities, and the expected return on the
assets of the plan. The second component is designed to eliminate any
surplus or deficit in the plan over a specified period of T years. The lower
the level of T, the faster any deficit is eliminated and the lower the potential
claim on the PPF. The simplest formulation that achieves this is:

 

dLt At
L t  At
kt ¼ p t þ
 (r þ x a
^)At þ
:
(12)
dt Lt
T
a
^ is the excess return on equities assumed by the firm in setting its
contribution rate; it may be identical with the true a, but is not necessarily
so. Define the solvency ratio of the fund a as:
at ¼

At
:
Lt

(13)

Then, using Ito’s lemma, we can calculate the stochastic differential
equation governing the evolution of the solvency ratio as follows:
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adL
da ¼ dA=L 
L 


dL
¼
r þ xa 
a þ (kt  pt )=L dt þ xsm adzm
Ldt


1a
þ x(a  a
^)a dt þ xsm adzm :
¼
T
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(14)

We can express this equation in terms of the risk-neutral probability
measure Q by substituting Equation (3) to give:


1a
a
^ax dt þ xsm adzmQ
da ¼
(15)
T
Given the investment policy and the contribution policy, the solvency
ratio follows a stationary stochastic process that is independent of the
behavior of liabilities. We can derive the unconditional distribution of a
at time t under the risk-neutral measure by stating the condition that the
distribution is stationary using Equation (15) to derive a differential equation. Formula (10) then gives the fair premium rate p (expressed as a
proportion of the liabilities of the pension plan) as:
ð1
p ¼ d (1  a)g Q (a) da:
(16)
0

Note that the true equity risk premium, a, does not enter into Equation
(14), and hence will not affect the risk neutral density function g Q or the
premium rate p. A higher equity premium raises the expected future
solvency level of pension schemes, but this is offset by the increase in
discount rates used for valuing the PPFs. However the equity premium
assumed by the scheme (^
a) does enter into the premium; the higher the
assumed premium, the lower the contribution rate and the greater the
expected claim on the Fund.
The premium can be compared with the unconditional objective expectation of the rate of claims as a proportion of liabilities, c, which we calculate
in a similar way, using Equation (14) instead of Equation (15). The resulting expected cost of claims is:
ð1
c ¼ d (1  a)g P (a) da where g P satisfies:
0
2

1 d
d
(x 2 s2m a 2 g P (a) ) 
2 da 2
da




1a
þ x(a  a
^)a g P (a) ¼ 0:
T

The differential equation expresses the condition that the distribution of
the solvency ratio is stationary.
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Extending the Model. One element of unrealism in our model is that the
solvency ratio of the pension fund is not bounded above. There are limits
on the degree to which the pension fund can hold assets in excess of its
liabilities, imposed largely to prevent the sponsor company using the
pension fund as a tax avoidance device. We can readily impose the
condition in our model that a is not permitted to exceed some limit a*.
Whenever a does exceed the limit, the contribution rate is constrained to
force a below the limit. a* acts as a reflecting barrier.
We assume that firms are able to reclaim investment surpluses from their
pension plans over the same time horizon over which deficits are amortized. In practice, firms may struggle to reclaim investment surpluses because they face pressure to improve benefits or because they do not wish to
be seen ‘raiding’ the pension plan of their employees.
We have also assumed that the liabilities that are guaranteed by the
PPF are the same as those used to determine the firm’s pension contribution. In practice these two measures of liability may well differ substantially,
and in either direction. Not all accrued liabilities are guaranteed; there
is a cap on the level of wages on which the pension is guaranteed; the PPF
only guarantees 90 percent of deferred pensions, and certain pension
increases are not guaranteed. In addition, the definition of liabilities used
by actuaries in computing funding levels generally takes account of future
wage growth in computing the pension liability arriving from past service.
Finally, the actuarial valuation may also use a higher discount rate in valuing
liabilities than the rate at which the liabilities can be bought out in the
market.
The model can readily be adapted to distinguish between the liabilities
used for funding requirements and those that are guaranteed by the PPF if
we assume that the ratio of guaranteed liabilities to the actuary’s measure
of liabilities is constant. Denote the ratio by l. Assume also that the PPF
retains a prior claim on all the assets of the fund if the firm becomes
insolvent. Maintain the definition of a as the ratio of plan assets to the
cost of meeting the liabilities guaranteed by the PPF. Then a mean reverts
to 1=l rather than to 1. The adjustments to the model are obvious. For
example Equation (14) becomes:


1=l  a
da ¼
þ x(a  a
^)a dt þ xsm adzm :
(17)
T

The Stochastic Default Approach
With stochastic default, the log-leverage ratio l i of firm i follows the stochastic process:
dl i ¼ k(l  l i )dt þ sv dzvi

(18)
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and the firm defaults when the leverage ratio hits an absorbing barrier at 0.
The correlation between innovations in the log-leverage ratio and innovations in the market index is constant, and the idiosyncratic risk is uncorrelated across firms so:
E[dzvi  dzm ] ¼ rdt;
E[dzvi  dzvj ] ¼ r2 dt (i 6¼ j):

(19)

Endnotes
1. For brevity, this chapter uses the word ‘pension’ to mean a private-sector DB
occupational pension.
2. Legislation provides that at least 80 percent of the premium should be riskbased, tied to scheme solvency, sponsor credit rating, investment policy, and
other factors relevant to the likelihood of a claim.
3. We use the term ‘deficit’ to mean the difference between the market value of
assets and the cost of buying out accrued liabilities. According to a forthcoming
report by an Institute and Faculty of Actuaries working party, of 685 actuarial
valuations surveyed in 2001 and 2002, the average valuation discount rate was
approximately 140 b.p’s above gilt rates (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
2004).
4. These figures should be treated with caution inasmuch as the valuations for each
firm are at the balance sheet date which varies across firms.
5. This figure appears comparable with the premium rates initially proposed for
the PPF, which is expected to raise £300 m per year in revenues. While it is not
easy to give a precise estimate of the insured liabilities, it is worth noting that the
DB liabilities of FTSE-350 companies in Table 7-1 amount to nearly £300 billion,
and the pension liabilities of non UK-based companies, including UK subsidiaries of overseas companies may be of the same order.
6. The reason that raising the cap has such a small effect is that the risk-adjusted
probability of reaching 120 percent solvency is rather small, so the cap does not
greatly affect contribution levels.
7. For example: ‘We will make sure that in future individuals in final salary schemes
will never again face the injustice of saving throughout their lives only to have
their hard-earned pension slashed just before they retire. The Pension Protection Fund will allow individuals to save with confidence.’ (Smith 2004)
8. The level of liabilities faced by the PPF is perfectly correlated with the level of the
equity market. This means that the PPF could, in principle, reduce or even
eliminate credit risk by selling equities. While this hedging might not be desirable or even practicable, it does provide a price for the risks to which the PPF is
exposed.
9. We are implicitly assuming that the investment policy of a closed fund precludes
the trustees from investing in risky assets and putting the solvency of the fund at
risk.
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